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In this perspective we suggest that chunking can be used as an investigative tool to
determine the characteristics of other cognitive phenomena. We present an example
of the usefulness of chunking multiple responses to aid in understanding object switch
costs. Switch costs refer to the shorter response times for manipulation of the same
item on two trials in a row compared to a switch between items. It is presently unclear
if this result is due to structural or strategic processes. We provide a short review of
past literature on switch costs and a proof-of-concept example that chunking may shed
new light on this topic. We examined this question with boxes filled with numbers to be
arithmetically updated and memorized. A situation in which there were two response
items to be manipulated per trial eliminated or reversed the switch cost effect. We
suggest that participants use a strategy in which the two output responses were
chunked together, making it unfeasible to prepare separately for a repetition of the most
recent item as participants do in other circumstances. Our data suggest that even a well-
studied phenomenon can benefit theoretically from the use of chunking as a research
tool.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of mentally combining several stimuli to form a single, meaningful unit or chunk in
working memory has existed over half a century (Miller, 1956). Although the original purpose of
discussing chunking was to understand how to assess the capacity of working memory, we detect
that chunks can be elicited to serve another experimental purpose. Chunking can be used as an
investigative tool to examine processing strategies. One can distinguish between mental structures,
which would presumably process information in the same way, automatically, no matter what the
participant’s intentions, and strategies, which are at least partly under volitional control of the
participant. For Miller, strategies were involved in the process of converting items to chunks, as
when a binary numerical representation is converted to decimal, to decrease greatly the number of
chunks to be retained in working memory (e.g., 100101= 37).
We term the kind of chunking that Miller (1956) investigated input chunking but we also can
point to two other types. In task chunking, the participant is encouraged to learn a sequence of
tasks that reliably repeat. For example, Koch et al. (2006) required reporting of the form, size, or
color of an item and found an advantage for a known sequence of these tasks, but only when the
participant was made aware of the repeating sequence. This is not a foregone conclusion, because
task chunking was found to be strategic when it could have been structural (present regardless of
the participants’ awareness).
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Here we point out a third type of chunking that we term
response chunking. This phenomenon can occur when the task
requirements are such that two or more stimuli are to be
followed by multiple responses. The participant has the choice
of carrying out some requisite processing for Stimulus A and
then responding to A, followed by processing B and then
responding to B; or, alternatively, processing both A and B and
then responding to both in turn. As we will see in our empirical
example, this strategic diﬀerence is important and can shed light
on whether the underlying processing is itself open to strategic
inﬂuences.
A particularly robust eﬀect in working memory research for
which we illustrate the strategic basis, using response chunking,
is that of object switch costs. Switch costs refer to the additional
time it takes to respond to Trial n compared to Trial n-1 when
Trial n is a response to a new item as opposed to a repetition of
the same item as in Trial n-1. Switch costs are large magnitude
eﬀects (e.g., Oberauer, 2002), which might be taken as evidence
that they are structural and automatic rather than strategic in
origin. In fact, though, whether switch costs are the result of
some inevitable, structural process, such as the distinctiveness
of a memory trace from the most recently completed cognitive
process, is a fundamental issue yet to be resolved. There is at
least one example of switch cost eﬀects that appear dependent on
speciﬁc task demands. Gehring et al. (2003) examined the speed
of incrementing counts for two streams of symbols, with “#” and
“@” assigned to one stream and “&” and “%” assigned to the other
stream. In some sequences of trials, a switch from one stream to
the other was unexpectedly advantageous compared to no switch,
possibly because of expectations (e.g., the expectation of a switch
following the sequence 12121_). Rather than replicate Gehring
et al. (2003) we chose to focus on the potential eﬀects of chunking
with regard to potential variability of switch costs.
There are few examples of chunking within the switch cost
literature, and what examples there are do not reference the
kind of chunking we wish to test. Oberauer and Bialkova (2009)
and Gilchrist and Cowan (2011) examined the eﬀect of input
chunking: they required participants to respond to stimuli based
on the combination of two features. The conclusion of Oberauer
and Bialkova (2009) was that the focus of attention was limited to
a single chunk no matter whether that chunk was a single item,
or a learned pairs (two color-number associations). Gilchrist and
Cowan (2011), on the other hand, found a situation in which two
associations could be held in working memory either separately
(e.g., triangle-z and red-2) or as a single chunk (e.g., with the
association between triangle-z and red-2 learned). When the
associations were held separately, changing either one of them
between trials slowed response times (RTs), but changing both
of them slowed RTs even more. After the two associations were
combined into a learned chunk, changing either of them slowed
RTs just as much as changing both of them. Thus, after an input
chunk is formed, repetition is beneﬁcial but changing part of the
chunk requires that the individual encode the entire set anew
(cf. Oberauer and Bialkova, 2011). These papers were directed at
understanding the fundamental limit of the focus of attention,
not the role of strategies per se. It would be possible to extend
this research to examine strategies, for example by showing that
a learned association can be either used or ignored, with diﬀerent
outcomes.
We examine response chunking, and use it to ask whether
switch costs themselves are the outcome of a strategic
conﬁguration in the mind rather than being automatic or
structural. After Oberauer (2002), we used sets of three boxes with
a digit in each box. Whereas Oberauer (2002) proceeded to ask
participants to update a single box per trial (e.g.,+3), we required
that two boxes be updated on each trial. This arrangement
allowed six diﬀerent sequences relating Trial n-1 to Trial n, as
shown in Table 1 (left-hand column). The same two boxes could
be updated in the same order on these two successive trials
(denoted AB/AB), the order of updating could switch (AB/BA),
and/or the previously non-updated box could be updated (e.g.,
AB/CA). The expectations pertain to the six trial types shown in
the table.
We suspect that individuals often seek the least eﬀortful means
to complete the task, which should depend on the exact setup.
With the single-switch procedure, the least eﬀortful means is to
retain the task set on Trial n-1 in case it is still relevant on Trial n.
Bymaking the situation more complex, we open up the possibility
of a change in what is strategically best. It might be strategically
best to preserve the last response without any chunking, but that
response would only be preserved on 1/3 of the trials (third and
fourth rows of Table 1). If that is what is found, the results will
be the same as in previous studies so we will not be able to
rule out the possibility that switch costs are indeed automatic.
However, it alternatively might be strategically best to encode a
pair of responses as a chunk that can be preserved for the next
trial, though that same pair would only repeat on 1/6 of the trials
(ﬁrst row of the table). If neither of these strategies is fruitful,
the participant could throw out each pair and start anew. If this
strategy is taken, there could be a switch beneﬁt rather than a
switch cost, as interference from repetition is avoided when there
is a switch. Notice that the last two strategies would produce
results diﬀerent from the usual switch cost, and therefore would
demonstrate that switch costs are strategic, not automatic.
METHODS
Participants
Summer undergraduate psychology course credit was awarded
to 24 participants (14 female, 10 male; mean age 21.21 years,
SD = 1.67). Four additional participants were excluded; two
because of a native language other than English and two because
they did not make any correct responses in at least one condition.
This study was carried out in accordance with the ethical
guidelines of the American Psychological Association and was
approved by the University of Missouri Institutional Review
Board. All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure
With stimulus sizes based on Oberauer (2002), participants
viewed three boxes on the screen, each with a single digit inside.
The participant memorized the digits and then pressed the
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TABLE 1 | Response times as a function of condition.
Condition Response 1
(SEM)
Response 2
(SEM)
Trials
possible
Trials
completed
AB/AB 3575 (171) 2319 (168) 864 630
AB/AC 3548 (160) 2494 (173) 288 201
AB/A 3561 (159)
AB/BA 3486 (211) 2391 (149) 864 639
AB/BC 3366 (202) 2530 (210) 288 203
AB/B 3426 (200)
AB/CA 3407 (244) 2584 (184) 288 219
AB/CB 3245 (173) 2277 (187) 288 199
AB/C 3326 (195) − − −
Completed trials refer to correct trials; the trial block ended after the first mistake.
Condition can be read with each letter representing a random box. For example,
Condition AB/CA represents a Trial in which any Box A and Box B are updated in
turn, followed by a trial in which Box C and then A are updated. The letters do not
reflect ordinal positions; e.g., on some trials A is the middle box, B is the right box,
and C is the left box. Mean response times are in milliseconds, with standard errors
of the mean in parentheses.
SPACE key to continue. Diﬀerences from Oberauer were (1) the
use of only one row of boxes per trial, and (2) the requirement of
two concurrent operations at each step as opposed to only one.
In particular, two of the three digits were replaced by arithmetic
operations (e.g., +2 and −3) such that each result remained 1–
9. Each trial had one arithmetic update highlighted with a green
box, signifying this should be the ﬁrst response provided, and
another in a black box, for which the second response on the trial
was to be given. (The green box was a diﬀerent box from trial to
trial and the response order was random, rather than always from
left to right.) Participants were to solve the equation and key in
responses as quickly and accurately as possible, using the top row
of number keys on a standard QWERTY keyboard. The response
digit was also to replace the previous digit in the target box for
subsequent trials in the block.
The experiment thus posed a strategic choice as to whether the
responses should be converted to a single chunk or maintained
uniquely from each other. Given that there were three boxes,
at least one of the boxes was updated on both Trial n-1 and
Trial n.
There were six key conditions that could take place in the
experiment. (1) An AB/AB condition is a repetition of the same
two targeted items, A and B, requiring responses in the same
order on two consecutive trials. If the response is converted to a
two-item chunk, repetition of the chunk leads to the prediction
of the shortest RTs of any condition. (2) An AB/BA condition
is a repetition of the most recent element and should provoke
the shortest ﬁrst response if there is no chunking and each item
is considered individually. (3) An AB/BC condition contains the
same repetition as Condition 2 and should have as short of a ﬁrst
RT if there is no chunking. (4) An AB/AC condition contains a
non-immediate repetition for the ﬁrst response, like Condition
1. (5) An AB/CA condition contains a non-immediate repetition
for the second response. (6) An AB/CB condition contains a
non-immediate repetition for the second response.
There were eight practice blocks and 24 experimental blocks
of six trials (12 arithmetic updates) per block. Trials 2, 4, and
6 in a block always included the same two boxes as Trial n-1,
though the response order could be reversed, whereas Trials 3
and 5 always included the box not selected on Trial n-1. Data were
excluded from analyses following the ﬁrst incorrect response in a
trial, regardless of recovery from an error later in a trial sequence.
Individual trial RTs less than 0.5 s were excluded because they
were thought to represent primarily guesses, and those longer
than 10 s were excluded because they were thought to represent
inattention to the task. These exclusion parameters resulted in
approximately 27% of all trials from analyses, almost all from
errors during a trial block.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the mean RT for the ﬁrst and second responses
in each of the six key conditions. RT1 is more theoretically
diagnostic because RT2 is dependent on processing related to
RT1. If switch costs were automatic and applied at the individual-
response level, then one would expect a cost when the ﬁrst
response of Trial n occurred on a diﬀerent box than the second
response of Trial n-1, compared to when they occurred on the
same box (e.g., a faster RT1 of Trial n forAB/BA than forAB/CA.).
If switch costs were automatic but applied to the pair of responses
together, then one would expect a cost when the ﬁrst response
of Trial n occurred on a diﬀerent box than the first response
of Trial n-1 (e.g., a faster RT1 of Trial n for AB/AB than for
AB/BA). As one can see, neither of these structural predictions
were supported in the data.
We conducted a Bayesian ANOVA (Rouder et al., 2009) of all
of the data with two within-participant factors: response serial
position (1 or 2) and task condition (1–6 corresponding to the
rows of Table 1). The ANOVA shows the best model was one
that took into account only the response position, Bayes Factor
(BF)= 15.61e+ 31. This model accounts for 94.10% of the error.
Condition, in contrast, could not be said to lead to a diﬀerence in
RT, BF = 0.017, or 59 to 1 in favor of a null eﬀect.
Our subsequent analyses were designed to get a more powerful
view of possible eﬀects of switches on RT1, which was of most
theoretical interest given that RT2 may be contaminated by RT1
processing. We carried out a second Bayesian ANOVA on RT1
alone (BF = 0.254) and Bayesian t-tests on RT1 separately for
the six conditions in the experiment. There was no switch cost
on RT1 (Table 1). In fact, we found some switch beneﬁts. All
paired-sample, two-tailed tests provided anecdotal-to-moderate
evidence for no diﬀerence between conditions (Rouder et al.,
2009), BF between 0.222 and 0.707, with two exceptions. The RT
for the pure chunk replication condition, AB/AB (M = 3575 ms,
SEM = 171 ms), was longer than AB/CB (M = 3245 ms,
SEM = 173 ms), BF = 13.61. This provides strong evidence
that these two conditions diﬀer in RT. Likewise, the AB/AC
(M = 3548 ms, SEM = 160 ms) condition was longer than
AB/CB, BF = 4.76. This provides moderate evidence that these
two conditions diﬀer in RT. In each case the diﬀerence in RT was
opposite the direction of a predicted switch cost. Close inspection
of the table and the analyses show a trend suggesting that
whenever C is included, as the ﬁrst or second response, then RT1
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1942
Blume et al. Chunking and Switch Costs
beneﬁts. This pattern can be attributed to the notion that the
inclusion of C signals to the participant that the previous chunk
should be discarded.
Nevertheless, when one collapses across the second response
for simplicity (see Table 1, bolded rows for means), the basic
trends hold: there is no overall eﬀect in the Bayesian ANOVA,
BF = 0.63; in t-tests, AB/A = AB/B, BF = 0.37; AB/A > AB/C,
BF = 2.98; and AB/B= AB/C, BF = 0.31.
DISCUSSION
In our experiment we were able to completely negate the switch
cost eﬀect by requiring multiple responses on a single trial.
Furthermore, we actually reversed the direction of the eﬀect
so that participants showed some switch beneﬁts. Participants
were able to respond the fastest when the least amount
of information was carried over from Trial n-1 to Trial
n, in direct contrast to the switch cost eﬀect when only
one item is updated per trial. The greatest RT disparity
occurs between the AB/AB and AB/CB conditions. The former
condition simply repeats a chunk the same way a single
update version of the task (e.g., Oberauer, 2002) repeats
a single item. Despite the similar conditional parameters,
the dual-update trials now result in the longest RT rather
than the shortest. The AB/CB condition requires that the
one item not in mind on the previous trial be brought
to mind; this results in the shortest RT. These data seem
to indicate information in mind from a previous trial will
interfere with the ability to respond on following trials. The
diﬃculty appears to be in disconnecting each item from a
two-item chunk from the previous trial in order to make the
response. This interpretation is in line with past literature on
response inhibition (Koch et al., 2010), interference (Carroll
et al., 2010), and updating sets of items (Kessler and Meiran,
2006).
In this short experiment we hoped to illuminate a portion
of the as yet unidentiﬁed nature of the switch cost eﬀect by
introducing a chunking strategy. The present results are in
line with the assertion that, when requiring two responses per
trial, a response chunking strategy can negate the switch cost
eﬀect. Participants responded either as fast or faster when a
condition introduced a new item on a particular trial. An
updating task with only one item in mind appears conducive
to the strategy of preparing for the same item repeatedly
(or at least failing to disengage attention from that item).
However, an updating task that requires at least two items in
mind does not appear to engender the same strategy. It may
be that a chunking strategy is used rather than a switching
strategy.
Participants were able to provide the second response
per trial in each condition about 1s faster than the ﬁrst
responses. However, the RT in each case is over 2 s, which
seems to be longer than should be necessary to simply ﬁnd
and press a key. We account for this relatively long RT as
another result of the participant’s strategy during the task.
After providing RT1, the only time available to prepare for
the upcoming trial was between RT1 and RT2, so we believe
that participants prepared for Trial n+1 during this inter-
response interval. Similarly, Kessler and Meiran (2006) showed
that the set size of non-updated items can increase the RT
costs associated with the procedure. In other words, when an
update occurs to one item from a set of items, the entire
set must be updated. We posit from the current data that
the full set update occurs following Response 1, but prior to
Response 2.
CONCLUSION
In our experiment, we were able to reverse the switch cost eﬀect
by setting up a situation demanding strategies that discouraged
retention of the pre-switch objects. No switch cost was ever
produced even when compared to trials on which the same single
item was updated consecutively (AB/BA). RT appears to show
that participants attempted to clear the contents in mind from
the previous trial to avoid interference between Trial n-1 and
Trial n.
This research represents an initial foray into the determination
of whether switch cost eﬀects are the result of some automatic
or strategy-based process. Our results support a strategy-
based interpretation of switch costs when multiple items
can be chunked together within a trial, but more research
is needed to suﬃciently resolve this issue. The updating
procedure and resulting switch costs can be a promising
avenue of work on how, or if, individuals are able to
chunk multiple output responses. From the literature and
our own data, we believe that it is possible to distinguish
between three ways in which chunking processes can
be used as a tool that illustrates the strategic nature of
processing, which we have termed input, task, and response
chunking.
We have focused on the usefulness of response chunking
to understand the strategic nature of switch costs, which
previously might have seemed like automatic eﬀects.
A similar research strategy could be useful to examine
other eﬀects that seem ubiquitous, e.g., various stimulus-
response compatibility eﬀects and Stroop-like eﬀects. For
example, if trials are presented in pairs and most of the
time a congruent response follows an incongruent one, then
the rare presentation of a congruent–congruent trial pair
should violate expectations for the second trial and rupture
the strategy that has developed across the task, slowing the
second-trial RT and thus revealing the strategic nature of the
task.
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